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 Abstract 
 
 
 
We use data from the British Skills and Employment Surveys to document and try to account for 
sustained work intensification between 2001 and 2017. We estimate the determinants of work 
intensity, first using four waves of the pooled cross-section data, then using a constructed pseudo-
panel of occupation-industry cells. The latter suggests that there are biases in cross-section models 
of work intensity, associated with unobserved fixed effects in specific occupations and industries. 
The pseudo-panel analysis can account for just over half (51 percent) of work intensification using 
variables measuring effort-biased technological change, effort-biased organisational change, the 
growing requirement for learning new things and the rise of self-employment. We interpret the 
work intensification and these effects within a power-resources framework.     
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Increasing or especially high work intensity in a range of occupations and settings is commonly 
reported in the modern era (Green 2006; Kelly and Moen 2020). Studies of abating work intensity, 
by contrast, are rare (Willis, Toffoli, Henderson and Walter 2008). While work intensity is not 
found to increase everywhere in all periods, sustained aggregate work intensification across whole 
nations or groups of nations is also extensively reported (e.g. Gallie and Zhou 2013).  
What is behind this seemingly widespread phenomenon? In this paper, we deploy new data to 
document and try to understand a sustained period of work intensification experienced by workers 
in Britain between 2001 and 2017. This period encompassed the financial crisis of 2008-9, and 
nearly a decade of post-crisis, austerity-driven low economic growth. The main sources of work 
intensification evoked in earlier studies include technical, organisational and industrial change, 
declining worker power, and increased insecurity. In addition to studying this particular period in 
the evolution of work intensity in one liberal market economy, our paper aims to contribute a better 
understanding of which aspects of technological and organisational change are the salient 
determinants of work intensification, and to consider also other potential contributory factors 
behind high work intensity: the demands of a learning environment in the developing knowledge 
economy, the perceived degree of competition, gender and changing forms of employment.  
We ask how far any or all of these factors can provide a proximate account of the rise in work 
intensity. We study the association between these factors and the trend in work intensity first in 
the context of cross-sectional models using the pooled data between four separate waves of the 
survey data. We then re-estimate the model using a pseudo-panel formed of occupation-industry 
cells over four waves of data. We ask whether the factors associated with high work intensity in 
cross-sectional analyses remain important after controlling for unobserved occupation-industry 
specific fixed effects in a pseudo-panel analysis. 
High and rising work intensity matters because of its detrimental effects on well-being, according 
to multiple theoretical perspectives and a considerable body of evidence (Eurofound 2019). In 
economics there is a direct negative effect – the marginal disutility of effort. For psychological 
and sociological theories the detrimental effects of high work intensity on well-being may be direct 
– for example, in predicting suicidality (Younès et al. 2018). More commonly, work intensity is 
also seen as a job demand whose effects are theorised to be mediated and/or mitigated by other 
2 
 
 
factors, notably the degree of autonomy in the Job Demands-Control model (Karasek 1979), or the 
level of social support (for example, Fletcher and Payne 1980; Deery et al. 2010). In the more 
general ‘Jobs Demands and Resources’ model, work intensity is a job demand with both direct and 
mediated effects on stress (Bakker and Demerouti 2007). The effects have been studied across 
Europe (Avgoustaki and Frankort 2019), and in many sectors and industries in recent years: for 
example, public sector workers in Australia (Omari and Paull 2015); Mercedes Benz workers in 
Sao Paolo (Pina and Stotz 2015); school principals (Wang, Pollock and Hauseman 2018) and 
nurses (Zeytinoglu et al. 2007) in Ontario. 
Work intensity is also one of many factors directly affecting productivity, and therefore of interest 
from employers’ perspectives --  even though the negative influence on wellbeing may moderate 
this effect. Ackroyd and Bolton (1999) illustrate this point in their analysis of nurses in an English 
hospital, where increased patient throughput was achieved through work intensification (see also 
Willis et al; 2016). 
 
Work intensity and work intensification 
Work intensity is one dimension of work effort, referred to sometimes as intensive work effort, 
the other being the extensive dimension, i.e. hours of work. Defined as ‘the rate of physical and/or 
mental input to work tasks performed during the working day’ (Green 2001, 56), work intensity is 
constituted by several elements, including the rate of task performance, the intensity of those tasks 
in terms of physical, cognitive and emotional demands, the extent to which they are performed 
simultaneously or in sequence, continuously or with interruptions, and the gaps between tasks. 
‘Work intensification’ then refers to an increase in work intensity. 
A modern-day understanding of the trend in work intensity has its origins, in part, more than half 
a century ago. The theory of rising managerial control (Friedmann 1946; Braverman 1974) led to 
the expectation of work intensification as managers increasingly gained command of the labour 
process. With the rising complexity of corporations and workplaces, and increasing worker 
resistance to restraints on their autonomy, different forms of control evolved  – identified by 
Friedman (1977), for example, as ‘direct control’ and ‘responsible autonomy’, or by Edwards 
(1979) as ‘simple’, ‘technical’ and ‘bureaucratic’ control of the workplace. With these 
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foundations, work intensity was an important feature in subsequent labour process literature, as 
indeed it had been a century earlier in Marx’s own writings; and in recent years, with the negative 
effects on well-being of high work intensity acknowledged, it has come to be considered a key 
domain of job quality. In Europe work intensity is one of seven dimensions of job quality which 
the European Foundation for Living and Working Conditions is tasked by the European parliament 
to monitor alongside other characteristics (Eurofound 2012; European Parliament 2017; 
Eurofound and ILO 2019).  
Yet work intensification had already become something of a puzzle in late 20th century capitalism 
(Green 2006). Increased affluence in the latter half of the twentieth century was accompanied in 
most countries by rising real wages for many workers, for long periods of time; and yet this 
embraced significant periods of declining job quality through work intensification. Work 
intensification has been recorded, inter alia, among managers (Hassard, McCann and Morris 
2011), nurses (Ackroyd and Bolton 1999; Adams et al. 2000; Zeytinoglu et al. 2007), government 
service workers (Carter et al., 2011), automobile and aerospace workers (Stewart, Danford, 
Richardson, and Pulignano 2010), apparel industry workers (Taplin 1995), meat processing and 
confectionery industry workers (Caroli, Gautie and Lamanthe 2009), school teachers (John 2008; 
Wotherspoon 2008; Beck 2017; Braun 2017), university lecturers (Ogbonna and Harris 2004), 
domestic workers (Hopkins 2017), IT workers (Kelly and Moen 2020) and care workers (Cooke 
and Bartram 2015). Periods of aggregate work intensification across whole nations are also widely 
reported: in the US between 1997 and 2006 (Maume and Purcell 2007; Kalleberg 2011); in Britain 
in the early 1990s and probably before, and then again in the mid-2000s, after a pause in the late 
1990s and the start of the 2000s (Green 2001, 2006; Burchell 2006; Green and Whitfield 2009; 
CIPD 2013); in France from the mid-1980s until 1998 (Gollac and Volkoff 1996; Valeyre 2004), 
in New Zealand and Australia in the 1990s (Morehead et al. 1997; Allan et al 1999); in Ireland 
between 2003 and 2009 (Russell and McGinnity 2014); in Finland from 1977 to 1997 (Mustosmaki  
Oinas and Anttila 2017). According to the European Working Conditions Survey, nine out of 
fifteen European nations saw work intensification between 1995 and 2010 (Green et al. 2013); 
according to the European Social Survey, work intensification is found in all types of employment 
regime throughout the European Union between 2004 and 2010 (Gallie and Zhou 2013). 
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This late 20th century puzzle was reinforced by the discovery of declining worker autonomy in 
Britain, another highly important aspect of job quality (Gallie, Felstead and Green 2004); a similar 
story is found for Norway between 1989 and 1997 (Olsen, Kalleberg and Nesheim 2010), and for 
a group of continental European countries between 1995 and 2010 (Holman and Rafferty 2017). 
The combined trends for rising work intensity and declining autonomy may have interacted to 
generate rising work strain and associated consequences for workers’ mental health, even while 
wages were mainly still rising.  
A possible partial resolution of this apparent paradox – rising job quality in one important 
dimension (wages) while falling in another – can be derived from hypotheses about the nature of 
technological change in the modern era (Green 2004b). While recognising that technological 
change is endogenous, determined by both economic and social factors, it is argued that the general 
purpose technology of the modern era – information and communication technology (ICT) – has 
been effort-biased.  
Two mechanisms are proposed. According to one, ICT facilitates more efficient organisation of 
tasks during the working day, diminishing gaps, enabling multi-tasking and streamlining 
workflows (for illustrative case studies, see Fernie and Metcalfe 1998; Boggis 2001). Workers 
willing to undertake the harder work involved take advantage of the flexibility that ICT brings, in 
order to be more productive and earn higher wages as compensation in a conventional Smithian 
labour market. According to the second mechanism, ICT enables managers to better monitor and 
discipline workers’ effort and thereby enforce higher work intensity requirements and lower 
efficiency wages (e.g. Bain and Taylor 2000; Skott and Guy 2006). Though not without its critics 
(Timmons 2003), this ‘panopticon’ theory of work intensification leads to the hypothesis that work 
will become more intense in jobs where tasks become more easily monitored.  
Several pieces of empirical evidence testify to there being a positive association between 
computerised and/or automated technologies and work intensity (Green and McIntosh 2001; Green 
2006; Felstead, Gallie, Green and Henseke 2016; Chesley 2014; Bigi, Greenan, Hamon-Cholet 
and Lanfranchi 2018). Bittman, Brown and Wajcman (2009) found that mobile phones at work 
intensified the work of men, though not women, in a sample of Australian workers. In contrast, 
Menon, Salvatore and Zwysen (2019) find only small effects in a pan-European Union study. 
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Taken together, these studies do not establish that growing ICT use alone has a large enough effect 
to explain the observed widespread extent of work intensification. Furthermore none distinguishes 
between the mechanisms through which work intensity is raised. Reported effect sizes vary across 
studies, reflecting in part the different ways that computerisation is measured. Most studies (an 
exception is Felstead, Gallie, Green and Henseke (2016) derive their findings from cross-sectional 
analyses.  
An alternative account of work intensification, drawing on a variety of literatures, sees its origins 
in new forms of industrial organisation (Grimshaw, Cooke, Grugulis and Vincent 2002; Harrisson 
2008; Ramioul 2008) – including outsourcing, sub-contracting, joint ventures and long-term 
contractual arrangements across value chains –  and in the parallel spread of new management 
practices with associated re-organisation of work. It is argued that widespread work re-
organisation has a sustained impact on work intensity – a process we term ‘effort-biased 
organisational change’, also with two mechanisms similar to the hypothesised effects of ICT.  
First, changes in work organisation that raise efficiency can require engaging and selecting 
workers who accept working harder. In some studies work re-organisation is predominantly found 
to entail decentralisation with accompanying additional responsibilities and work intensification 
(e.g. Maschino 2008). More generally, teamworking, polyvalence and organisational flexibility 
enable hard-working workers to become more productive; eliciting increased work intensity may 
also involve an explicit link of pay with performance (Weitzman and Kruse 1990; Gallie, White, 
Chengt and Tomlinson 1998; Appelbaum et al. 2000; Green 2004b; Ogbonnaya, Daniels and 
Nielsen 2017). 
Second, work intensification may be a consequence of the closer control and discipline afforded 
by modern forms of management, including Just-In-Time (JIT)/Total Quality Management (TQM) 
practices originating in Japan (Delbridge, Turnbull and Wilkinson 1992), lean production systems, 
high-performance work practices including teamwork (Sewell and Wilkinson 1992; Baldry et al. 
1998; Harley 1999; Ramsay et al. 2000; Stewart et al. 2010; Rees and Gauld 2017), and 
management through target-setting (Bain et al. 2002). Target-setting is assumed to be a key part 
of efficient management (Awano et al. 2018). While this analysis mainly stems from studies of 
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for-profit sectors, studies of lean production reveal similar outcomes in the public sector (e.g. 
Carter et al. 2011).  
In this line of argument, team cooperation and discipline, together with incentive pay, target-
setting and other elements of the “high-involvement” package, constitute key modern forms taken 
by the long-term trend towards work intensification. Yet, before accepting that effort-biased 
organisational change through the spread of new management practices could provide a plausible 
account of sustained economy-wide work intensification, two points need to be noted. First, the 
evidence from recent literature is mixed: some studies confirm a link between high-performance 
work practices (including teams) and high work intensity (e.g. Kalleberg, Nesheim and Olsen 
2009; Omari and Paull 2015; Garcia, Javier and Pelaez 2017), while others find the connection 
tenuous, confounded by other changes that are introduced at the same time as new management 
practices (Lindsay et al. 2014; Stanton et al. 2014). The scarce longitudinal quantitative evidence 
is also mixed (Felstead et al. 2019). Second, there is no certainty that high-performance practices 
continue to proliferate in Britain; by the 2000s they no longer merited the epithet ‘new’.  
Earlier studies have also noted a relationship between upskilling and work intensification (Harvey 
1995; Gallie et al. 1998; Green 2004a). This correlation might derive from the twin effects of 
technical and organisational change affecting both skills and work intensity (e.g. Stewart et al. 
2010). More directly Forrester (2002) posits that learning initiatives may have become a new form 
of work intensification in the knowledge economy, incorporated into managerial strategies. When 
jobs are redesigned or upgraded this can involve multiskilling, and increased workloads through 
the addition of new tasks to job descriptions such as requirements to undertake new training, and 
provide instruction to others (Adams et al. 2000). Dysvik, Kuvaas and Buch (2014) find that more 
training leads to higher work intensity when there is a lack of support from managers.  
The organisation’s changing environment, with greater external competitive pressure, may also be 
expected to be reflected in greater work intensity, either directly or indirectly through work 
reorganisation and new technology. Trade unions have provided a counterbalancing force (Green 
and McIntosh 2001); yet while unions remain much stronger in Britain’s public than in its private 
sector, their power to influence job quality was greatly diminished after 2000 (Bryson and Green 
2016). Even though public sector workers might be subject to less commercial competition, 
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commercial pressures have been substituted by quasi-market pressures in many parts of Britain’s 
public sector in recent decades. 
Three further factors merit attention. First, work intensity may be affected by the form of 
employment. Self-employment expanded significantly through the great recession and beyond in 
Britain. We hypothesise that ceteris paribus self-employment requires higher workloads 
associated with self- and business-management, and hence greater work intensity; yet here the 
previous evidence is scarce and inconclusive (Baumberg and Meager 2015). A temporary labour 
contract could also signal insecurity and greater work pressure. However, there have been no major 
rises in the use of temporary contract labour in Britain (Felstead, Gallie, Green and Henseke 2018). 
Moreover, the evidence as to whether job insecurity is a significant stimulant of high work 
intensity is also mixed, with some studies finding small effects, others none (Gallie 2002, 2005; 
Gallie and Zhou 2013; Green 2004b). 
Second, earlier research has mostly found that gender discrimination is reflected in differential 
effort requirements for men and women, with women having to commit to higher work intensity 
(Gorman and Kmec 2007; Kmec and Gorman 2010; Floro and Pichetpongsa 2010; Russell and 
Mcginnity 2014; Burchell and Fagan 2004; Lindley 2016). This gender differential constitutes a 
potential contributor to overall work intensification, given the ongoing rise in female labour force 
participation.  
Third, the regulation of work hours is a potential influence. In France, the ‘Aubry’ laws afforded 
workers from 2000 the protection of the 35-hour week, but led to many employers instituting 
compensatory rises in work intensity which cannot be easily regulated (Askenazy 2002). A similar 
story accounts for the failure of the Five-Day Working reform in the Republic of Korea to deliver 
hoped-for benefits for employee well-being (Rudolf 2014). In Britain, however, work hours are 
regulated weakly, with widely-used opt-out possibilities from the European Directive on Working 
Time.  
To summarise our assessment of current understanding, there are well-established negative 
associations of work intensity with health and well-being. While there is some understanding of 
the factors associated with high work intensity, there remain several empirical questions about the 
strengths of the influence on work intensity of technical and organisational factors, the skills 
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environment, and other factors such as gender and the form of employment. One leading issue is 
whether the cross-sectional correlations that feature as evidence in most studies reflect genuinely 
causal underlying factors. Moreover, there is as yet no evidenced, general account of sustained, 
modern-day generic work intensification.  
In what follows, we document the extent to which work intensification took place over 2001-2017 
in Britain. We then ask, first, whether the level of work intensity over this period is associated with 
workplace characteristics in ways consistent with the above theories, aiming to contribute new and 
additional evidence derived from a large nationally representative data set. Second, we investigate 
whether these explanations retain support in the longitudinal setting of an occupation-industry 
pseudo-panel. Third, we ask how far the work intensification over the period can be accounted for, 
in a statistical sense, by the evolution of the labour process and labour market, as indicated by 
trends in the explanatory variables.  
 
Data and Measurement. 
We utilise data from the Skills and Employment Survey (SES), a consistent series of nationally 
representative sample surveys of individuals in employment in Britain, conducted at five or six 
year intervals, for which we and previous co-authors are responsible. In every case the samples 
were drawn using random probability principles subject to stratification based on socio-economic 
indicators; one eligible respondent per address was randomly selected for interview. Below we 
describe data on work intensification from 1992, although the four waves of data from 2001 until 
2017 are our main focus of analysis since these are years for which consistent data on relevant 
explanatory variables are available. We restrict our analyses to those aged 20-60 years old. We 
exclude Northern Ireland and the Highlands of Scotland, since these areas were only sampled in 
2006. For each survey, weights were computed to take into account some differential probabilities 
of sample selection, the over-sampling of certain areas and some small response rate variations 
between groups (defined by sex, age and occupation). All of the analyses that follow use these 
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weights. For more information on the series see Felstead, Green and Gallie (2015); the data can be 
accessed at the UK Data Archive.1 
The measurement of work intensity is not straightforward for well-known reasons (Green 2006). 
Most notably, it relies on workers’ self-reports and has no obvious metric unit equivalent to, for 
example, the weekly work time that measures extensive work effort. One general question used in 
a number of studies to capture work intensity in multiple settings asks respondents how much they 
agree or disagree with the statement “My job requires that I work very hard”, using a 4-point scale 
(“strongly agree/ agree/ disagree/ strongly disagree”) (Green 2001; Kalleberg 2011; CIPD 2013). 
This question was first used in a nation-wide context, to our knowledge, in the 1977 US Quality 
of Employment Survey. While this item has the advantage of potentially capturing several 
proximate contributors to hard work, and therefore being comparable across work settings, it may 
also be affected by the length of the working day. Indicators that measure proximate contributors 
to the rate of work input avoid that potential contamination, yet these will vary across work 
settings. Two such indicators in common use are the frequency of having to work at high speeds, 
and the frequency of having to work to tight deadlines (e.g. Avgoustaki and Frankort 2019). This 
is the approach taken since 1990 in successive waves of the European Working Conditions Survey. 
Respondents are asked “How often does your work involve working at very high speed”; they can 
answer against a 7-point frequency scale. Second, using the same scale jobholders are asked “How 
often does your work involve working to tight deadlines”. 
Whatever approach is taken, it is essential that job holders’ self-reports must use absolutely 
consistent wording and scales over time, and it must be assumed that there are no major changes 
in the understanding of that wording. The SES has the advantage that two of the above three items 
are available and consistent from 1992, and all three every wave from 2001. To capture as many 
elements of work intensity as the data allow, we use all three variables. As may be expected, these 
are positively correlated (see Annex), but since we aim to capture the different contributors to the 
input of effort across different settings we do not view these as manifestations of a single latent 
contributor to work effort. Rather we define an index, Required Work Intensity, to be the first 
                                                          
1 http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-8589-1 
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principal component of these variables, thereby capturing the maximum amount of variance in the 
items across individual work settings.2 We compute this for the pooled sample of all waves from 
2001 on. For ease of interpretation in the analyses to follow, we normalise the index so that it has 
mean zero by construction and a standard deviation of 1. Its distribution has skewness -0.20 
indicating a left-hand tail of jobs with low work intensity. Work intensification for any consistently 
defined sub-group is then computed from the differences in average Required Work Intensity 
between waves. 
A valid indicator of job quality should be a determinant of worker well-being; accordingly we ran 
a number of checks (see Annex) to test the validity of the Required Work Intensity index. We find 
that Required Work Intensity is unconditionally and conditionally (controlling for demographic 
variables) associated as expected with six indicators of workplace well-being: negatively with 
Warr’s Enthusiasm-Depression scores and Contentment-Anxiety scores; positively with 
workplace tension, exhaustion from work, dissatisfaction with the amount of work; and positively 
with pay (as predicted by compensating differentials theory). In nearly all cases the index is more 
closely correlated with the well-being indicators than any of its individual components. We also 
check whether our index is correlated with alternative proxy measures of work pressure. We find 
that Required Work Intensity is high when there are more factors controlling it other than the 
worker: machines, clients, bosses, colleagues, pay incentives and appraisals. The index is also 
highly correlated with a measure of “total generic task load” (an additive sum of generic task 
importance measures). Finally, we find that those respondents with high Required Work Intensity 
are much more likely to report having to work extra time beyond normal work hours. We can, 
therefore, have some confidence that our index is validly measuring the concept of work intensity. 
Nevertheless, it remains possible that some respondents interpret one or more items in part in terms 
of their extensive effort. Accordingly, in the analyses that follow we include working hours among 
the control variables where appropriate; our findings are not sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion 
of hours. Moreover, we do not claim that our approach is the last word on the measurement of 
                                                          
2 An alternative could be to sum the three standardised items. Implicitly an additive approach weights variables 
equally in their contribution to the index, while data reduction through principal component analysis generally 
derives different weights. In practice, an additive index turns out to be very highly correlated with the index we use 
( = 0.998). 
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work intensity; we respect the fact that some investigators from the psychology tradition would 
prefer that items be developed which exhibit sufficient correlation to allow the construction of an 
internally consistent scale, while being applicable to a large, nation-wide survey with finite 
interview time. 
To capture the role of technology we utilise three main indicators of automated or computerised 
technology, covering personal use, the workplace as a whole, and innovation. First, respondents 
are asked about the complexity of their own use of computers. Those who use computers grade 
their usage as straightforward, moderate or complex, with examples as anchors; we thus have a 
four-point scale from non-use to complex use. We expect that increasing penetration of ICT will 
be reflected by jobs moving up this complexity scale over time. Second, respondents report the 
proportion of employees at their workplace who work with computers, with a banded scale running 
from ‘zero’ to ‘more than three quarters’. Third, respondents were asked whether, over the 
previous five years, ‘new computerised or automated equipment was introduced into the 
workplace’, with the question appropriately adjusted for those with less than five years’ job tenure. 
To measure organisational and labour process factors relevant to hypotheses on work intensity, we 
use several indicators. First, respondents indicated whether they work in a team. Second, 
respondents were asked ‘how often does your work involve carrying out short, repetitive tasks?’, 
answering on a 5-points scale from 1 (‘never’) to 5 (‘always’). We treat this as a proxy measure of 
how easily jobs can be monitored and controlled; thus it is expected that jobs with more repetitive 
tasks will entail higher work intensity. As a partial validation of this indicator, we can call on other 
available indicators related to the direct controllability of work: we find that those in jobs that more 
commonly entail repetitive tasks are more likely than those in less repetitive jobs to cite a 
supervisor, a machine or assembly line, and colleagues as agents that control their pace of work; 
they also indicate that they could be dismissed for poor performance earlier than those in non-
repetitive jobs. Nevertheless, we recognise that this indicator is not a perfect measure of work 
controllability. Third, as an additional potential proxy for work controllability we include an 
indicator for working at home, though again this will be far from ideal (Felstead and Henseke, 
2017). 
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Fourth, we use an indicator of incentive pay: namely, whether pay is linked to performance at the 
individual, team or organisational level. Fifth, we include whether employees participate in quality 
circles – groups that meet regularly to discuss organisational improvements. Sixth, respondents 
were asked whether or not there had been a change over the previous five years ‘in the way work 
was organised’ (with the question adjusted, as above, for those with shorter job tenure). Finally, 
an indicator for whether management use is targets to direct work is derived from a question to 
employees: ‘are any targets set for improving the quality of work?’ Unfortunately this variable is 
only available in the 2001 and 2017 waves.  
To measure job skill level, we use the first principal component of three related variables capturing 
the highest required qualification level for new recruits to the job, the amount of prior training 
done at the start of the type of work involved, and the amount of learning time required to become 
competent in the job. To measure learning requirements of the job, respondents are asked how 
much they agreed with the statement ‘My job requires that I keep learning new things’; then ‘my 
job requires that I help others learn new things’. Each response scale is linearised from 1 to 4, and 
the two scales are summed to create the Learning Requirement Index with a seven-point scale, 
where six signifies strong agreement with both statements, and zero strong disagreement with both 
statements.  
To capture external competitive pressure respondents were asked to rate the degree of competition 
faced by their organisation on a 6-point scale from ‘very high’ to ‘not applicable’/very low. We 
also include a dummy variable for public sector. Union recognition is an indicator of potential 
counterbalance to competitive pressure. 
The other key explanatory variables arising from our literature discussion are gender and forms of 
employment (whether self-employed or employee, and if employee whether job contract is 
‘permanent’ or temporary). 
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Findings 
Trends in work intensity 
Figure 1 presents trends in indicators of high work intensity, as shown by the proportion of jobs in 
the ‘high’ part of each scale: for Required Work Intensity this is defined as above the mean; for 
Very Hard Work, ‘strong’ agreement’; for High Speed Work and for High Deadline Work, ‘at 
least three quarters of the time’. It confirms earlier studies that had reported a rapid intensification 
of work in Britain in the first part of the 1990s followed by a plateau of flat or declining work 
intensity in the latter part of that decade (Green 2001; Green and McIntosh 2001; Gallie 2005). 
The story from 2001 on is one of renewed work intensification. Between 2001 and 2006 there were 
rises in two out of three high-level indicators and in the overall index; from 2006 until 2017 all 
three indicators and the overall index increased. The prolonged steady rise of the average Required 
Work Intensity index between 2001 and 2017 – by some 20 percent of its standard deviation (see 
Table 1) – is the focus of this study. 
Figure 2 presents a kernel density plot of the distribution of the Work Intensity Index for the first 
and second halves of the period: it can be seen that the rise occurs across both low and high parts 
of the distribution. Significant work intensification is found across most industries, in almost all 
occupations and across almost all regions; and there is no sector, occupation or region that 
experiences a fall in work intensity. The timing of the work intensification varied between the 
private and public sector. Work intensification was greatest for the private sector between 2006 
and 2012 (spanning the financial crisis and recession) and for the public sector between 2012 and 
2017 (a period of severe austerity for public expenditure). Notwithstanding such variations, the 
widespread experience of work intensification is suggestive that generic factors may be behind the 
trend. 
Trends in explanatory variables 
A number of indicators changed in ways potentially consistent with work intensification (Table 
1): union recognition declined by 10 percentage points between 2001 and 2017; the average level 
of computer complexity moved 0.4 points up its four point scale of importance, while the 
proportion of workplaces where more than three quarters of employees used computers rose by 8 
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percentage points; the proportion of workers who had to work to targets on quality rose by 6 
percentage points; and the Learning Requirement Index increased by 11.6 (8 percent of its standard 
deviation). Yet, counterbalancing these changes, the rates at which new automated equipment and 
new work organisation were happening were both lower in 2017 than in 2001, while the overall 
skill level, the proportion of teamworking employees, and the perceived level of competition 
changed very little.  
 
Approach to analysis 
We first investigate the determinants of the Work Intensity Index using regression models with the 
pooled cross-sectional, individual-level data. Work intensity for individual i at time t is expected 
to depend on a set of covariates 𝑋𝑖𝑡 (personal and job characteristics) reflecting our hypotheses, a 
time trend  t picking up the generic change not explained by the covariates, unobserved 
job/individual heterogeneity 𝑢𝑖𝑡, and a random error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡: 
𝑊𝐼𝑖𝑡 =   + 𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (1) 
A comparison of the estimate of  with and without the covariates 𝑋𝑖𝑡 included in the model will 
provide a straightforward estimate of the extent to which those covariates account for the trend. 
Multivariate cross-section regressions do not provide unbiased estimates of effects if the 
unobserved job-individual effect is correlated with the relevant covariates. One issue could be 
common-reporter bias: both work intensity and the explanatory variables are reported by the job-
holder, whose attitudes and personality may influence responses to both the dependent variable 
and covariates; to assess common-reporter bias, in one robustness test we add Big Five personality 
controls (which are available for some but not all waves) and examine whether their inclusion 
significantly alters the estimates.  
Another issue is that unobserved job-individual effects factors may be associated with occupation-
industry factors associated with certain key explanatory variables: an example might be the use of 
industry-specific technologies that permit greater work control. To reduce bias associated with 
these unobserved job-related factors, we undertake a separate, longitudinal analysis at the level of 
occupation and industry.  
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We average over individuals i in each industry-occupation j; thus, we have for the average work 
intensity in j: 
𝑊𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ jt =   + 𝑡 + 𝛾?̅?𝑗𝑡 + ?̅?𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀?̅?𝑡        (2) 
If it is assumed that the ?̅?𝑗𝑡  are time-invariant (i.e. the unobserved characteristics of the jobs/ 
individuals in each occupation-industry cell which relate to work intensity are stable: ?̅?𝑗𝑡 = ?̅?𝑗), 
then this contributor to potential bias can be eliminated using conventional panel estimators. We 
therefore derive a pseudo-panel comprised of occupation-industry cells from each survey wave 
(Deaton 1987). We construct cells of 1-digit occupation (9 of these) by 1-digit industry (17). Thus, 
example cells are managers in Transport, Storage & Communication,  professionals in Hotels & 
Restaurants, and so on. Since some occupations do not appear in every industry, there are fewer 
than 153 non-empty cells in each year/wave. For analysis purposes, we drop those cells with fewer 
than 50 observations in total. This leaves a balanced panel containing 264 observations over four 
waves. Following Deaton (1985) our analyses weight cells by the square root of the number of 
observations in each cell.  
  
Results from pooled cross-section analysis of work intensity 
Model (1) in Table 2 is a raw regression on year, giving the overall time trend. We tested for non-
linearity using a regression on year dummies and the hypothesis of a linear trend between 2001 
and 2017 could not be rejected (p=0.41); hence we use a linear trend specification in all models 
for parsimony and ease of presentation. In model (2) all explanatory variables for the full sample 
are introduced. In model (3) we include a set of dummy variables for the industry-occupation 
combination, where industry and occupation are each categorised at 1-digit level. In model (4) we 
introduce the two workplace change variables; this model must be applied to a somewhat reduced 
sample, consisting of those who had not recently moved job. Finally, model (5) introduces Targets 
on Quality as an explanatory variable: this substantially reduces the sample to those from just the 
2001 and 2017 waves. 
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Model (1) reconfirms the presence of positive significant work intensification over 2001-2017. 
The estimated coefficient is the average annual trend rise in work intensity, 1.34 percent of its 
standard deviation. 
Effort-Biased Technological Change 
Consider first the hypothesis of effort-biased technological change. Model (2) shows that the 
complexity level of workers’ computer use is positively associated with required work intensity: 
comparing the lowest with highest complexity level, work intensity varies by 0.096 of a standard 
deviation (= 3 x 0.032). In model (3), controlling for industry-occupation fixed effects, the gap is 
somewhat higher at 0.13. In model (3) we see a small additional effect from other workers: 
compared with establishments where none are using automated equipment, respondents in 
workplaces where at least three quarters are doing so have their work intensity raised by 0.06. 
Models (4) and (5) show no significant effect from new computerised equipment having been 
recently introduced. Since the trend is towards more complex levels of computer use, these 
findings together give support to the view that technology change in the form of computerisation 
is effort-biased.  
The key indicator is the intensity of personal computer use, graded across levels of complexity 
(but see the sensitivity tests reported below). The use of computerised technology generally at the 
establishment, similarly increasing, may also have a role. 
Effort-Biased Organisational Change 
Turning next to the hypothesis of effort-biased organisational change, it is instructive initially to 
consider whether this hypothesis is consistent with workers’ own perceptions of organisational 
change. Respondents to the 2017 wave who had reported a recent change in the way work was 
organised at their workplace were asked “Thinking about the effort you personally have to put into 
your work, has this change required you to work [much harder/ somewhat harder/ neither more 
nor less hard/ somewhat less hard/ much less hard] than before”. A considerable majority – 63 
percent -- reported harder, 32 percent neutral, and just 5 percent said less hard; this majority 
reporting harder work was greater (at 69 percent) among respondents when the organisational 
change was indicated to be a major, rather than a minor, change.  
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Perceptions, however, cannot on their own be taken as sufficient evidence for effort-biased 
organisational change. From model (2), it is seen that work intensity is higher – by 0.055 of a 
standard deviation) for employees engaged in teamworking. The effect of short, repetitive tasks in 
a job is quite substantial, consistent with the hypothesised greater potential to monitor work in jobs 
with more repetitive tasks. Moving just one point up the five-point scale towards greater 
repetitiveness is associated with a 0.126 rise in work intensity (model (2)). Higher work intensity 
is also reported where jobs involve taking part in quality improvement circles (by 0.089 standard 
deviations, model (2)), but the effects of performance-related bonuses are insignificant. The effects 
of working at home are negative, as in model (2), but the estimates are relatively imprecise and 
the coefficient is statistically insignificant in our other three models. Work intensity is also 
significantly raised (by 0.121 standard deviations) where there is recently introduced 
organisational innovation (model (4)). Finally, model (5) shows that, for the restricted sample from 
just the 2001 and 2017 waves, work intensity is also strongly associated with the use of targets (by 
0.219 standard deviations).  
Pressure of the Learning Environment 
Turning next to the links with skill, work intensity is associated positively with job skill level 
(model (2)), confirming previous research. We also find, for the first time, that there is a strong 
link with a job’s requirement to learn. A one point change in the Learning Requirement Index is 
enough to alter work intensity by 16.2 percent of a standard deviation (model (2)).  
Competitive Environment 
As expected, for those who perceive that the degree of competition is ‘very high’, compared with 
those where it is ‘very low’, work intensity is significantly greater by 0.256 (= 4x0.064). Allowing 
for that, working in the public sector is also associated with greater work intensity, on average by 
0.10 of a standard deviation. The hypothesis that unions can counterbalance work pressure and 
reduce work intensity is given only weak support: their effect is small for the main, full sample 
(models (2) and (3)), but is larger and statistically significant for the restricted samples of model 
(3) and (4) which exclude those with under three years’ job tenure. After interacting union 
recognition with the trend, we could find no evidence that the union effect had changed over time 
(not shown in the table). 
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Form of Employment 
The form of employment is found to matter. In particular, work intensity is significantly higher – 
by 0.238 of a standard deviation – among the self-employed, compared with employees (model 
(2). By contrast, there is no evidence that work intensity among employees is positively associated 
with having a temporary job contract. Indeed, models (2) and (3) show instead a negative 
association with being in a temporary job. In an alternative specification (not shown) we replaced 
temporary contract status with indicators of job security and the probability of employment after 
job loss: together these had no significant effects on work intensity.  
Gender and Hours 
All models confirm the majority of earlier studies in establishing that women report considerably 
higher levels of required work intensity than men: in model (2) the gender gap in work intensity is 
15.4 percent of a standard deviation. Work intensity is also higher for those working more hours 
per week. 
Proportion of Work Intensification Accounted For 
By comparison of the time trend coefficients between model (1) and model (3) which includes the 
industry-occupation dummy indicators, model (3) accounts for just 22 percent of the time trend. 
With the reduced sample used in model (4), the reduction in comparison with a raw regression on 
time trend is 23 percent; in the two wave sample for model (5), the reduction is 26 percent. We 
note that the model and this calculation assumes that, in the absence of theoretical reasons for 
supposing otherwise, the effects of the independent variables (𝛾) are time invariant. 
Results from pseudo-panel models 
In all the above, coefficients could only be assumed to be unbiased estimates of the effects of 
changes in the covariates on the strong assumption that the covariates are exogenous. Table 3 
presents findings from fixed effects and difference estimators of the determinants of the Work 
Intensity Index, using the pseudo-panel construction of the data. These models remove biases 
deriving from time-invariant associations between covariates and particular industry-occupations 
cells, though they could still be subject to other biases.  
To account for work intensification we first entered all variables used in the cross-section analysis 
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of Table 2, model (2). Given the relatively small sample size, we selected a parsimonious model, 
after omitting variables with very low explanatory power. Following the rule to omit variables 
with the t value under 1, we arrived at the models shown in Table 3. The full model with all 
variables included is given in the Annex, Table A4. Several variables that are significant in the 
cross-section analysis do not appear in the parsimonious model. 
Model (1), Table 3, shows the raw annual time trend of work intensity: it reveals a similar degree 
of work intensification over time as shown previously in the pooled cross-section. Model (2) shows 
the conventional fixed-effects panel estimator. Model (3) is a simple difference estimator: in effect 
this is a regression of the determinants of between-wave annual work intensification. However, 
this estimator is less efficient than the fixed effects estimator. 
The estimates confirm the hypothesis of effort-biased technological change, in that increases in 
computer complexity raise work intensity. Using the preferred (fixed-effects) estimates in model 
(2), stepping up one level of computer complexity is associated with a 0.17 increase in work 
intensity. Effort-biased organisational change is also confirmed, through the positive impact of 
teamworking, consistent with earlier studies that have shown this link. Compared with workers 
not in a team, those in a team are estimated to experience a substantial 0.33 higher work intensity. 
The estimates also show that work intensification is greater where the prevalence of short repetitive 
tasks in occupation-industry cells increases, consistent with the hypothesis that work 
intensification is associated with a greater potential for managers to control the pace of work. 
Finally, the positive effects on work intensity of raising the learning environment and of increasing 
self-employment are likewise strongly reproduced in this panel context. The difference estimator 
coefficients are quite similar.  
Compared with the cross-section estimates in Table 2, the effects of computer complexity, 
teamworking and self-employment are notably higher, that of the Learning Environment quite 
similar, and that of short repetitive tasks a little lower. 
 
Proportion of Work Intensification Accounted For 
Comparing the trend coefficients in columns (1) and (2), the extent to which overall work 
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intensification is accounted for in this panel framework is just over a half (51 percent). Calculating 
the contribution of each variable from the product of its annual trend and its estimated coefficient, 
we derived a simple decomposition, giving the contribution of each covariate: 32 percent from 
computer complexity, 6 percent from the growth of teamworking; and 5 percent each from 
increased prevalence of short repetitive tasks, the growth of the Learning Requirement Index, and 
the growth of self-employment.  
Sensitivity Tests 
In sensitivity tests, we added to Table 2 model (2) by including the “Big Five” personality variables 
in an analysis restricted to the 2012 and 2017 waves (online Annex Table A3). This analysis shows 
that workers with higher measures of Conscientiousness and of Extraversion recorded lower levels 
of work intensity; however, this effect is orthogonal to the effects of our explanatory variables, 
whose coefficients do not significantly change when the Big Five are introduced. Reporter 
personality, therefore, seems unlikely to be a source of major common-reporter bias in the main 
cross-section results. Next, we replaced our measure of the complexity of computer use with a 
measure of the importance of computer use (A5). This alternative produced a similar pattern of 
findings, in both the cross-section and pseudo-panel estimates. When, however, we replaced it 
with a simple dummy for computer use, the estimated coefficient is significant in the pseudo-panel, 
but small and insignificant in the cross-section estimates. Third, we divided teamworking into 
three sub-types (A5): self-directed teams, semi-autonomous teams and other teams (Gallie, Zhou, 
Felstead and Green 2012) (respectively 14%, 13% and 73% among all teams). All three types 
carried positive coefficients in both cross-section and panel models, significant in most, not all 
cases. Finally, in the pseudo-panel analysis we conducted sensitivity checks around the industry-
occupation cell size cut-off, setting this to be either 40 or 60; we found that these variations did 
not alter the pattern of results (A5b). 
 
Discussion: what accounts for persistent, generic work intensification and will it continue? 
We have documented a steady process of moderate work intensification in one country over the 
sixteen years following 2001 – a rise in  the Required Work Intensity index by 0.20 of a standard 
deviation which, from the cited evidence, will have had significant effects on workers’ health and 
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well-being. To put this work intensification into perspective the rise in the computer complexity 
level, in this prime era of workplace computerisation, was similar (0.25 of a standard deviation). 
Far from an isolated episode, the rise follows an earlier period of work intensification in the 1980s; 
and in the 1990s work intensification was especially rapid according to one of our three component 
indicators; and there were similar processes in other countries. 
One might question whether this aggregate intensification is real or illusory, drawn as it is from 
workers’ personal reports of their work. We argue that it is unlikely to be a statistical artefact, 
given the care taken to ensure consistent survey questions and context throughout, the high-quality 
clustered random sampling methods, the consistent trend shown by the three constituent measures, 
and the validations of our key index. Even if a hidden process of habituation had occurred during 
the period, which cannot be ruled out, involving respondents softening how they answer questions 
about a high pace of work, this would lead to an underestimation of change. Beyond this, we must 
also acknowledge some limitations of the methodology: although in our robustness tests the 
inclusion of personality variables where available does not alter the findings, it remains possible 
that other unobserved person-fixed-effects within occupation-industry cells, which are not 
controlled for, may induce biases; and there are no appropriate instruments available for the 
explanatory variables. 
Previous studies have not attempted to explain this generic process. We find that four factors – 
effort-biased technological change, effort-biased organisational change, the growing requirement 
for learning new things and the rise of self-employment – together account in a statistical sense for 
part of this work intensification, in the case of the preferred fixed effects estimator in the pseudo-
panel analysis 51 percent.  
While we characterise the role of computerisation in multiple ways, the rising complexity level of 
personal computer use turns out to be the most important factor accounting for work intensification 
in this period. Grading the intensity and/or level of individual computer use, with a scaled, rather 
than a dichotomous measure of computer use, seems advisable at least when studying a country 
that is advanced in its level of computerisation. The large majority of British workers (89% in 
2017)  make some use of computers or automated equipment in their jobs. Our finding contrasts 
with that of Menon et al (2019) who report insignificant computer effects on work intensity except 
22 
 
 
for among routine cognitive occupations. This difference may have arisen from both 
methodological and data differences, including that their study combines two dichotomous 
indicators to measure work intensity, uses a dichotomous indicator of computer use, and focuses 
on Europe as a whole. For future research we recommend to utilise multi-level indicators to 
estimate the effects of  computer complexity; it may also become important to allow for the effect 
of given levels of computer complexity to change over time. 
As for effort-biased organisational change, the key variables turn out to be teamworking and the 
design of work as short repetitive tasks – suitable, we argue, for closer control. In contrast, other 
variables highlighted in high-involvement management literature, in particular, the use of quality 
circles and performance pay, were not found in our panel analysis to have a significant effect on 
work intensification, even though they are significantly correlated with work intensity in the 
pooled cross-section.  
Consistent with earlier cross-sectional studies, gender is a significant factor, with women in jobs 
that require higher work intensity than men. However, from the pseudo-panel estimates the within-
cell gender changes over time did not alter work intensity. Similarly, within-cell changes in union 
recognition, workplace computerisation/automation, use of quality circles, working at home, or 
weekly hours were not significant determinants of work intensification. The implication is that 
these effects are associated with time-invariant occupation-industry specific characteristics, which 
are themselves linked with required work intensity.  
How can this collective evidence be interpreted to provide a coherent understanding of generic 
work intensification? Power-resources theory provides a plausible framework. According to this 
framework, a combination of financialisation with increased international outsourcing, changing 
social norms and institutions supported by the state, alongside rising monopsony power in labour 
markets, has both increased the degree of competition in product markets and shifted the balance 
of power between firms and employees in favour of the former, bringing about a decisive shift in 
the distribution of income (e.g. Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin 2013; Krueger 2018; Flaherty 2015; 
Darcillon 2015; Kohler, Guschanski and Stockhammer 2019). We would suggest that, due to the 
declining power of both organised and unorganised labour to resist pressures from employers in 
Britain’s liberal market economy, technical and organisational changes have been harnessed in 
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combination to intensify work. Consistent with Braverman’s neo-Marxian prediction of half a 
century ago, work intensification has turned out to be an ongoing tendency in modern-day 
capitalism, at least in this part of the world where we have consistent measures over a long period. 
Yet there is a difference: this work intensification is not associated with an ongoing deskilling and 
simplification of work. The one-time assumption that greater job skill meant lower management 
control and less power to intensify work has been thrown into question (Jackson and Jordan 2000). 
Importantly, we do not see technological change as an exogenous factor. The ways that new 
technologies are adapted for use in industry reflect firms’ objectives. Whether technologies are 
designed and used to facilitate harder work directly, or to enhance surveillance of the labour 
process, they form the channels through which the increased power of employers can be exercised. 
Similarly, rather than take organisational change as following the technology in a deterministic 
manner, how organisations arrange themselves reflect the institutional environment, alongside 
managerial agency. The same applies also to the other prominent proximate factors: the 
requirements in the knowledge economy to engage more in learning new tasks, and the resort of 
more workers to self-employment, each channel an increased imposition of tasks and greater work 
intensity. But these links should be regarded, not as manifesting some abstract learning 
requirement or a magically risen preference for self-employment, but as reflecting a world of work 
where learning requirements can be imposed on top of, rather than instead of other tasks, and where 
some workers turn to self-employment and all its demands, rather than consent to declining wages 
and working conditions as employees or, worse, to unemployment.  
We have presented no formal evidence for this interpretation, and doubt that it would be possible 
to find adequate measures to test it. The circumstantial evidence, however, is suggestive. The long-
term decline in the wage share of national income in many countries (including Britain)3, showing 
labour’s inability to fully capture the rewards of rising productivity, is one common indicator of 
the shifting balance of power. Recent firm-level evidence shows the declining extent to which 
British workers have claimed a share in rents (Bell, Bukowski and Machin 2019). Unlike earlier 
periods in Britain and elsewhere, the current era of work intensification presents no apparent 
                                                          
3 https://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/employment-and-social-policy/The-Labour-Share-in-G20-Economies.pdf;  
https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/135320/economics/labour-share-of-gdp/  
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paradox: rather than occurring at a time when job quality was improving in other dimensions, the 
work intensification since 2001 has taken place alongside a decline in several other job quality 
facets. Wages began falling in the mid-2000s, and there have been declines too in workers’ task 
discretion, and in workplace training opportunities (Gallie, Felstead, Green and Henseke 2018; 
Green et al. 2016); the long-term decline in weekly work hours that had resumed in the middle of 
the 1990s slowed to a halt by 2010; while the zero-hours contract, a quintessentially precarious 
form of employment, spread rapidly after 2000 (ONS 2019). The EU’s index of physical working 
conditions, which had been improving in the UK until 2005, slipped back between 2005 and 2010 
(Green et al. 2013). If the declining bargaining power of labour is the central explanation for work 
intensification, this simultaneous decline or stagnation of other dimensions of job quality is what 
one would expect.  
As a counter to this explanation, one might have expected respondents’ perceptions of product-
market competition, declining union recognition and temporary contracts to have played a more 
significant role in our findings. Perceived competition, while an important factor in our cross-
section estimates, was insignificant in the pseudo-panel. Yet our measure can only be a loose 
indicator at best of respondents’ power to influence how their work is organised and how hard they 
work. Union recognition was only significant in two out of the four cross-section models, and not 
in the pseudo-panel. Part of the historical decline since the 1970s lies in their substantially 
diminished influence where they remain present, both over wages and over work intensity (Bryson 
and Green 2015); spill-over effects from union to non-union sectors can also be discounted over 
the period of our investigation. And while some unions retain important roles inside the opposition 
Labour Party, declining union power at state level inhibits their ability to affect the legislative 
agenda. Finally, unlike the growth of self-employment, temporary job contracts have not grown 
and are not the route to work intensification in this liberal market economy, possibly because there 
are fewer regulatory differences from permanent contracts than are found in much of continental 
Europe. 
As for the future, getting people to work harder is inherently self-limiting as a growth strategy, 
unlike investing in their human capabilities or new capital. Our measures also have scales with 
built-in ceilings. Yet, there is a long way to go before those ceilings are reached. There is 
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substantial variation in the work intensity index, and its negative skewness testifies to the presence 
of a minority with rather low work intensity. Thus there remains scope for continued work 
intensification in the coming years, and a corresponding need for policy-makers and researchers 
concerned with work-related health and well-being to monitor this important dimension of job 
quality. Work intensification could be abated if there were a concerted move to facilitate trade 
unions to bargain over working conditions, or if otherwise employers could be persuaded by 
successful experiments in job re-design (Kelly and Moen 2020); its deleterious effects on well-
being could at least be alleviated by affording employees better social support, designing jobs to 
have greater task discretion and providing more opportunities for organisational participation. 
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Figure 1 Trends in Work Intensity in Britain, 1992-2017 
 
Notes: Very hard Work: proportion of jobs where respondent reports ‘strong’ agreement that the job requires 
working very hard; High Speed Work, Tight Deadlines: proportion of jobs where respondent indicates ‘at least three 
quarters of the time’; High Work Intensity Index: proportion of jobs where the Work Intensity Index is above zero. 
 
Figure 2 The Work Intensity Index in Britain, Kernel Density Plots. 
Pooled Data 2001-2006 and 2012-2017 
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Table 1 Descriptives of Work Intensity and Key Explanatory Variables 
1a Work Intensity 
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Range Mean 
Change,  
1992 to 
2017 
Mean 
Change,  
2001 to 
2017 
Work Speed  (pooled 1992, 
2001, 2006, 2012 and 2017) 
3.896 1.830 1-7 1.227* 0.266* 
Tight Deadlines (pooled 2001, 
2006, 2012 and 2017) 
4.67 1.91 1-7 na 0.331* 
Hard Work (pooled 1992, 1997, 
2001, 2006, 2012 and 2017) 
3.305 0.651 1-4 0.206* 0.116* 
Work Intensity Index (pooled 
2001, 2006, 2012 and 2017) 
0 1 -3.12 to 
1.76 
na 0.204* 
 
1b Independent Variables 
Variable 
  (pooled 2001, 2006, 2012 and 
2017) 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Range Change in 
Mean,  
2001 to 2017 
     
Complexity of Computer Use 1.701 1.14 1-4 0.391* 
Workplace Computing (Ref.: 
none)   
 
 
Some, <= 1/2 0.201 0.401 0-1 -0.056* 
 1/2 to 3/4 0.158 0.365 0-1 -0.008 
>= 3/4 0.544 0.498 0-1 0.079* 
New Automated Equipment† 0.554 0.499 0-1 -0.120* 
Teamworking Employee (0/1) 0.525 0.499 0-1 0.016 
Short Repetitive Tasks 3.318 1.138 1-5 0.034* 
Performance-related pay 0.368 0.482 0-1 -0.036* 
Quality improvement circles 0.351 0.477 0-1 -0.007* 
New Organisation of Work† 0.536 0.499 0-1 -0.026* 
Targets on Quality⁋ 0.482 0.500 0-1 0.059* 
Job Skill Level 
0.01 0.759 
-1.23 to 
1.38 0.039* 
Learning Requirement Index 4.101 1.397 0-6 0.116* 
Perceived degree of competition 2.633 1.464 0-4 0.005* 
Union Recognised 0.382 0.486 0-1 -0.098* 
Public Sector 0.274 0.446 0-1 -0.011 
Employee in Temporary Job 0.052 0.223 0-1 -0.014* 
Female 0.466 0.499 0-1 0.017* 
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Self-Employed 0.125 0.330 0-1 0.046* 
Working At Home 0.039 0.193 0-1 0.027* 
Hours Per Week‡ 37.3 13.0 8 - 168 -1.463* 
 
Notes: For most variables the number of cases for Table 1b is 15902, as used for analysis in Table 2, covering the 
pooled waves 2001, 2006, 2012 and 2017; † applies only to those remaining in the same job with the same employer 
for at least five years (or fewer, with a minimum of 1 year, depending on how long they have been in employment); 
⁋ applies to 2001 and 2017 waves only; ‡ usual hours incl. overtime; in a few cases (<3%), where hours vary and 
respondent says ‘it depends’, this variable is replaced by the gender-specific, pt-time/full-time specific average 
hours; variable definitions in text.  * indicates change is significant at 5%.
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Table 2 Accounting for Work Intensity: Pooled Cross-Section Models. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)†  (5)⁋ 
Trend 0.0134** 
(9.38) 
0.0113** 
(8.45) 
0.0105** 
(7.91) 
0.00933** 
(5.43) 
0.00883** 
(4.45) 
Complexity level of computer use  
 
0.0321** 
(3.90) 
0.0423** 
(4.74) 
0.0350** 
(3.01) 
-0.0122 
(-0.66) 
Workplace Computing: Some, <= 1/2  
 
-0.0246 
(-0.82) 
-0.0169 
(-0.55) 
-0.0405 
(-1.01) 
-0.142* 
(-2.27) 
Workplace Computing: 1/2 to 3/4  
 
0.00254 
(0.08) 
0.0182 
(0.55) 
-0.0196 
(-0.45) 
-0.136* 
(-2.04) 
Workplace Computing: >= 3/4  
 
0.0409 
(1.35) 
0.0599+ 
(1.91) 
0.0251 
(0.61) 
-0.0848 
(-1.31) 
Teamworking Employee  
 
0.0551** 
(3.42) 
0.0572** 
(3.52) 
0.0344 
(1.62) 
0.0294 
(0.87) 
Frequency of short repetitive tasks  
 
0.126** 
(18.96) 
0.128** 
(19.17) 
0.126** 
(14.54) 
0.136** 
(10.08) 
Employee with PRP  
 
0.0238 
(1.36) 
0.0219 
(1.21) 
0.0107 
(0.45) 
-0.0113 
(-0.30) 
Employee in Quality Circle  
 
0.0891** 
(5.32) 
0.0848** 
(5.07) 
0.0631** 
(2.94) 
0.0318 
(0.91) 
Working At Home  
 
-0.0664+ 
(-1.66) 
-0.0336 
(-0.83) 
-0.0778 
(-1.52) 
-0.122 
(-1.63) 
Job Skill Level  
 
0.0478** 
(4.05) 
0.0415** 
(3.11) 
0.0207 
(1.20) 
-0.0133 
(-0.48) 
Learning Requirement Index  
 
0.162** 
(25.97) 
0.170** 
(26.98) 
0.167** 
(20.21) 
0.143** 
(10.65) 
Level of Competition for Organisation  
 
0.0643** 
(10.91) 
0.0568** 
(9.14) 
0.0517** 
(6.43) 
0.0574** 
(4.59) 
Public Sector  
 
0.104** 
(4.53) 
0.0809** 
(3.07) 
0.102** 
(2.99) 
0.101+ 
(1.77) 
Union Recognised  
 
-0.0236 
(-1.31) 
-0.0292 
(-1.56) 
-0.0657** 
(-2.73) 
-0.135** 
(-3.51) 
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Self-Employed  
 
0.238** 
(8.36) 
0.220** 
(7.44) 
0.223** 
(5.80) 
0.231** 
(3.92) 
Employee in Temporary Job  
 
-0.0892** 
(-2.68) 
-0.103** 
(-3.08) 
0.0230 
(0.34) 
-0.227* 
(-2.21) 
Female  
 
0.154** 
(9.39) 
0.194** 
(10.92) 
0.220** 
(9.25) 
0.190** 
(5.06) 
Hours Per Week  
 
0.0143** 
(22.23) 
0.0130** 
(19.38) 
0.0134** 
(14.67) 
0.0137** 
(9.72) 
New Automated Equipment  
 
 
 
 
 
0.0205 
(0.98) 
0.0100 
(0.30) 
New Organisation of Work  
 
 
 
 
 
0.121** 
(6.01) 
0.155** 
(4.87) 
Targets on Quality  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.219** 
(6.71) 
Industry-Occupation Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0876** 
(-7.10) 
-2.116** 
(-42.54) 
-2.123** 
(-10.59) 
-1.750** 
(-7.14) 
-1.536** 
(-3.24) 
Observations 15902 15902 15902 9144 3693 
R2 0.006 0.161 0.192 0.195 0.229 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
† Model(4) applies to those remaining in the same job with the same employer for five years (or fewer, with a minimum of 1 year, depending on how long they 
have been in employment); ⁋ Model (5) applies to the 2001 and 2017 waves only. 
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Table 3 Accounting for Work Intensity: Pseudo-Panel Models. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Fixed effects Fixed effects Difference 
estimator 
Trend 0.0126** 
(6.51) 
0.00612* 
(2.57) 
- 
 
Computer Complexity  
 
0.173** 
(2.93) 
0.144* 
(2.47) 
Teamworking  
 
0.332* 
(2.27) 
0.318* 
(2.27) 
Short Repetitive Tasks  
 
0.0993+ 
(1.71) 
0.127* 
(2.31) 
Learning Environment  
 
0.159** 
(2.92) 
0.170** 
(3.19) 
Self-Employment  
 
0.500* 
(2.15) 
0.617** 
(2.82) 
Weekly Hours 
 
 0.00781+ 
(1.75) 
0.00322 
(0.74) 
Constant -25.21** 
(-6.50) 
-12.62** 
(-2.72) 
0.00598+ 
(1.72) 
Observations 264 264 264 
R2 0.177 0.309 0.141 
t statistics in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Online Annexe to “Working Still Harder”.  
This online annexe presents additional tables, including the validation test outcomes, and 
additional sensitivity checks mentioned in the paper, in five sections: 
A1. Correlations between Work Intensity Indicators. 
A2. Validity checks. 
A3. Inclusion of Big Five personality indicators. 
A4. Selection of parsimonious pseudo-panel model. 
A5. Sensitivity checks. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
A1. Unweighted Correlations between Work Intensity Indicators. 
 
Very 
High 
Speed 
Tight 
Deadlines 
Very 
Hard 
Work 
Required 
Work 
Index 
     
Very High Speed 1    
Tight Deadlines 0.465 1   
Very hard work 0.300 0.256 1  
Required Work 
Intensity 0.811 0.787 0.786 1 
 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------
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2. Validity checks. 
 
A2a Validation for Required Work Intensity Index: Consequences for Exhaustion and Tension. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 How often come 
home from work 
exhausted 
How often come 
home from work 
exhausted 
I work under a 
great deal of 
tension 
I work under a 
great deal of 
tension 
Work Intensity 0.390** 
(54.78) 
0.390** 
(54.79) 
0.446** 
(64.50) 
0.450** 
(64.93) 
Female  
 
0.069** 
(9.66) 
 
 
-0.004 
(-0.55) 
White  
 
-0.014* 
(-2.03) 
 
 
-0.002 
(-0.22) 
Age  
 
0.004 
(0.60) 
 
 
0.050** 
(7.26) 
Constant 0.390** 
(54.78) 
0.390** 
(54.79) 
0.446** 
(64.50) 
0.450** 
(64.93) 
Observations 16748 16748 16727 16727 
R2 0.152 0.157 0.199 0.202 
t statistics in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
 
Conclusion: Work intensity has positive correlations with workplace tension and exhaustion, as expected.
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A2b Validation for Required Work Intensity Index: Is it negatively correlated with well-being indicators and job satisfaction? 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Warr’s 
Contentment-
Anxiety Scale 
Warr’s 
Contentment-
Anxiety Scale 
Warr’s 
Enthusiasm-
Depression Scale 
Warr’s 
Enthusiasm-
Depression Scale 
Satisfaction with 
work amount 
Satisfaction with 
work amount 
Work Intensity -0.258** 
(-35.10) 
-0.258** 
(-34.96) 
-0.0546** 
(-7.11) 
-0.0497** 
(-6.48) 
-0.190** 
(-16.97) 
-0.190** 
(-16.85) 
Female  
 
-0.0723** 
(-4.90) 
 
 
0.103** 
(6.74) 
 
 
-0.0207 
(-0.92) 
White  
 
-0.0886** 
(-3.36) 
 
 
0.0996** 
(3.62) 
 
 
0.0514 
(1.35) 
Age  
 
0.00175** 
(2.62) 
 
 
0.00479** 
(6.88) 
 
 
0.000625 
(0.62) 
Constant -0.0236** 
(-3.20) 
0.0211 
(0.59) 
-0.0207** 
(-2.70) 
-0.350** 
(-9.42) 
5.045** 
(451.67) 
4.983** 
(94.86) 
Observations 16724 16724 16724 16724 12284 12284 
R2 0.069 0.071 0.003 0.010 0.023 0.023 
t statistics in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
 
Conclusion: work intensity has negative correlations with workplace well-being and job satisfaction, consistent with expectations.
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A2c Validation for Required Work Intensity Index. Does higher pay Compensate for 
Hard Work? 
 (1) 
 Log Pay 
Work Intensity 0.00981* 
(2.45) 
Education level held=1 [Ref: 0] 0.0539** 
(2.95) 
Education level held=2 0.0848** 
(5.25) 
Education level held=3 0.148** 
(9.19) 
Education level held=4 0.292** 
(17.52) 
Age 0.0384** 
(14.16) 
Age squared -0.000399** 
(-11.81) 
Female -0.0978** 
(-10.38) 
White 0.0732** 
(4.85) 
Wave 0.0254** 
(35.58) 
Constant -49.55** 
(-34.53) 
Observations 14196 
R2 0.441 
t statistics in parentheses; region, industry and occupation dummies included. 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
 
Conclusion: pay is positively correlated with the Work Intensity Index, ceteris paribus, as 
expected in compensating differentials theory; however, the implied compensation for 
working harder is small. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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The next set of checks examine whether the Work Intensity Index is correlated with 
alternative proxies, which are indicators of other concepts related to work intensity. 
A2d. Is Higher Work Intensity correlated with indicators of related concepts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Work 
Intensity 
Work 
Intensity 
Work 
Intensity 
Work 
Intensity 
Need to work extra time 0.308** 
(47.20) 
 
 
 
 
0.238** 
(35.82) 
Number of sources of work 
effortb 
 
 
0.0968** 
(17.45) 
 
 
0.0552** 
(10.69) 
Standardised Task Loadc  
 
 
 
0.345** 
(45.19) 
0.244** 
(31.00) 
Hours Per Weeka 0.00733** 
(12.66) 
0.0159** 
(27.67) 
0.00886** 
(15.46) 
0.00366** 
(6.43) 
Constant -1.070** 
(-45.35) 
-0.782** 
(-31.79) 
-0.342** 
(-15.23) 
-0.867** 
(-32.71) 
Observations 16727 16751 16756 16722 
R2 0.158 0.063 0.150 0.216 
t statistics in parentheses + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
a. Agreement with the statement: “I often have to work extra time, over and above the formal 
hours of my job, to get the work done.” Scale is “Strongly agree”/ “agree”/ “disagree”/ 
“strongly disagree”; b. number of factors affecting how hard you work, 0-5 (machines, 
clients, supervisor, colleagues, pay incentives, appraisals); c. Total generic task load, an 
additive sum of the following indicators: verbal tasks, numerical tasks, physical tasks, 
professional communication tasks, planning, client communication, problem-solving tasks, 
computer usage, learning tasks, and a a range of management tasks. Each of these indicators 
is derived from three or more items, using a 5-point importance scale. 
 
Conclusion from Models (1) and (4): those who report that sometimes they have to work 
extra time to ‘get things done’ are likely to have to pack more work into worktime, thus to 
work harder, as expected.  
 
Conclusion from Models (2) and (4): the more factors affecting how hard you work 
(machines, clients, supervisor, colleagues, pay incentives, appraisals), the greater the work 
intensity. 
 
Conclusion from Models (3) and (4): the greater your task workload the greater your work 
intensity conditional on hours worked. 
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3. Table A3 Sensitivity to inclusion of Big Five personality measures. (2012 & 2017) 
 (1) (2) 
Trend 0.0159** 
(3.29) 
0.0153** 
(3.15) 
Complexity level of computer use 0.0190 
(1.28) 
0.0196 
(1.32) 
Workplace Computing: Some, <= 1/2 0.0474 
(0.91) 
0.0419 
(0.81) 
Workplace Computing: 1/2 to 3/4 0.118* 
(2.14) 
0.112* 
(2.02) 
Workplace Computing: >= 3/4 0.125* 
(2.43) 
0.122* 
(2.37) 
Teamworking Employee 0.0454 
(1.62) 
0.0403 
(1.44) 
how often work involves short repetitive tasks 0.156** 
(13.69) 
0.156** 
(13.71) 
Employee with PRP 0.0258 
(0.85) 
0.0167 
(0.55) 
Employee in Quality Circle 0.0268 
(0.95) 
0.0281 
(0.99) 
Job Complexity 0.0481* 
(2.12) 
0.0497* 
(2.19) 
Learning Requirement Index 0.184** 
(17.30) 
0.184** 
(17.37) 
Level of Competition for Organisation 0.0397** 
(3.84) 
0.0402** 
(3.89) 
public 0.00260 
(0.06) 
-0.000233 
(-0.01) 
Union Recognised 0.00792 
(0.25) 
0.0124 
(0.39) 
Employee in Temporary Job -0.123* 
(-2.10) 
-0.124* 
(-2.13) 
Female 0.168** 
(5.86) 
0.166** 
(5.78) 
Self-Employed 0.233** 
(4.99) 
0.230** 
(4.93) 
Working At Home -0.0470 
(-0.79) 
-0.0525 
(-0.88) 
Hours Per Week 0.0139** 
(12.16) 
0.0139** 
(12.21) 
Extraversion  
 
-0.0253* 
(-2.01) 
Agreeableness  
 
-0.0166 
(-1.29) 
Conscientiousness  
 
-0.0438** 
(-3.32) 
Neuroticism  
 
-0.0207 
(-1.57) 
Openess  
 
0.0175 
(1.32) 
Constant -2.397** 
(-9.38) 
-2.394** 
(-9.38) 
Observations 5542 5542 
R2 0.219 0.222 
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4. Selection of parsimonious pseudo-panel model presented in paper: 
 
A4 Pseudo-Panel Analysis. Full and Parsimonious Models 
 (1) (2) 
Trend 0.00449+ 
(1.67) 
0.00612* 
(2.57) 
Complexity level of computer use 0.151* 
(2.13) 
0.173** 
(2.93) 
Workplace Computing: Some, <= 1/2 -0.205 
(-0.75) 
 
 
Workplace Computing: 1/2 to 3/4 0.303 
(1.02) 
 
 
Workplace Computing: >= 3/4 0.179 
(0.65) 
 
 
Teamworking Employee 0.325* 
(2.12) 
0.332* 
(2.27) 
Frequency of short repetitive tasks 0.112+ 
(1.80) 
0.0993+ 
(1.71) 
Employee with PRP -0.0732 
(-0.45) 
 
 
Employee in Quality Circle 0.128 
(0.93) 
 
 
Working At Home -0.0807 
(-0.66) 
 
 
Job Complexity 0.141* 
(2.30) 
0.159** 
(2.92) 
Learning Requirement Index -0.00929 
(-0.17) 
 
 
Level of Competition for Organisation -0.0239 
(-0.11) 
 
 
Public Sector -0.0469 
(-0.28) 
 
 
Union Recognised -0.307 
(-0.82) 
 
 
Self-Employed -0.119 
(-0.75) 
 
 
Employee in Temporary Job 0.527* 
(2.08) 
0.500* 
(2.15) 
Female 0.00241 
(0.01) 
 
 
Hours Per Week 0.00975+ 
(1.91) 
0.00781+ 
(1.75) 
Constant -10.82* 
(-2.04) 
-14.09** 
(-3.01) 
Observations 264 264 
R2 0.350 0.320 
t statistics in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Model (1) includes all variables included in the cross-section analysis shown in Model (2) of 
Table 2 in the main paper. 
 
Model (2) is the parsimonious model shown in the paper (Table 3), after taking out all 
variables where t<1. In the case of the workplace computing dummies, the hypothesis that 
they were all zero could not be rejected.  
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
5. Sensitivity checks. 
Model (1) in Table A5a presents the estimates shown in the text for comparison.  
We first substitute alternative indicators for computing use. Model (2) shows that a simple 
dummy variable for whether or not respondent uses computers has only a small and 
insignificant effect on work intensity. It is the whole scale that provides differentiation, rather 
than just the dummy for any computer use. Model (3) shows that substituting the importance 
of computer use (4-point scale runs from Not at all important/not applicable to Essential), for 
the complexity of computer use, makes little difference to the pattern of findings. Model (4) 
splits teams into sub-groups: self-directed teams, semi-autonomous teams and other teams. 
Self-directed teams have a high level of team discretion over what tasks they do, deciding 
how to do them and the quality standards to which they work. Semi-autonomous teams have 
a high level of team discretion over what tasks they do, deciding how to do them and the 
quality standards to which they work, and a substantial say over the composition and 
leadership of the team (Gallie et al., 2012). All three types have a positive coefficient, though 
other teams the coefficient is not significant. 
In Table A5b, sensitivity checks are shown with the pseudo-panel analysis.  
Model (1) presents again the fixed effects estimates shown in the paper (Table 3 column 2). 
Model (2) shows that using computer importance makes no significant difference to the 
pattern of results. Model (3) shows that the measure of any computing is positive and 
significant in this panel context. In model (4) there is no significant difference between the 
coefficients for all three sub-types of teams. Model (5) is a sensitivity check on requiring that 
there be at least 60 observations per industry-occupation, while model (6) relaxes this to 40 
observations. While coefficients vary somewhat, the pattern of results remains the same, with 
the same significant variables in the parsimonious equation, and non-significant differences 
compared with Model (1). 
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Table A5a Sensitivity Checks: Cross-section Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Trend 0.0113** 
(8.45) 
0.0121** 
(9.07) 
0.0112** 
(8.40) 
0.0115** 
(8.55) 
Complexity level of computer use 0.0321** 
(3.90) 
 
 
 
 
0.0339** 
(4.12) 
Workplace Computing: Some, <= 1/2 -0.0246 
(-0.82) 
0.00251 
(0.08) 
-0.0285 
(-0.94) 
-0.0242 
(-0.80) 
Workplace Computing: 1/2 to 3/4 0.00254 
(0.08) 
0.0532 
(1.58) 
-0.00871 
(-0.26) 
-0.00215 
(-0.07) 
Workplace Computing: >= 3/4 0.0409 
(1.35) 
0.110** 
(3.51) 
0.0246 
(0.77) 
0.0432 
(1.42) 
Teamworking Employee 0.0551** 
(3.42) 
0.0554** 
(3.44) 
0.0564** 
(3.50) 
 
 
Frequency of short repetitive tasks 0.126** 
(18.96) 
0.124** 
(18.70) 
0.125** 
(18.83) 
0.126** 
(18.95) 
Employee with PRP 0.0238 
(1.36) 
0.0318+ 
(1.82) 
0.0229 
(1.31) 
0.0269 
(1.54) 
Employee in Quality Circle 0.0891** 
(5.32) 
0.0922** 
(5.50) 
0.0894** 
(5.34) 
0.0860** 
(5.14) 
Job Complexity 0.0478** 
(4.05) 
0.0616** 
(5.28) 
0.0498** 
(4.27) 
0.0491** 
(4.17) 
Learning Requirement Index 0.162** 
(25.97) 
0.166** 
(26.48) 
0.162** 
(25.85) 
0.159** 
(25.37) 
Level of Competition for Organisation 0.0643** 
(10.91) 
0.0651** 
(11.04) 
0.0640** 
(10.85) 
0.0643** 
(10.91) 
public 0.104** 
(4.53) 
0.104** 
(4.54) 
0.104** 
(4.53) 
0.103** 
(4.52) 
Union Recognised -0.0236 
(-1.31) 
-0.0243 
(-1.34) 
-0.0261 
(-1.45) 
-0.0220 
(-1.22) 
Employee in Temporary Job -0.0892** 
(-2.68) 
-0.0870** 
(-2.61) 
-0.0869** 
(-2.61) 
-0.0907** 
(-2.73) 
Female 0.154** 
(9.39) 
0.152** 
(9.27) 
0.146** 
(8.93) 
0.157** 
(9.61) 
Self-Employed 0.238** 
(8.36) 
0.246** 
(8.61) 
0.240** 
(8.44) 
0.237** 
(8.35) 
Working At Home -0.0664+ 
(-1.66) 
-0.0516 
(-1.29) 
-0.0663+ 
(-1.65) 
-0.0697+ 
(-1.74) 
Hours Per Week 0.0143** 
(22.23) 
0.0145** 
(22.54) 
0.0143** 
(22.20) 
0.0143** 
(22.29) 
Any computing  
 
-0.0399+ 
(-1.69) 
 
 
 
 
Importance of computer use  
 
 
 
0.0258** 
(4.00) 
 
 
Employee in Self-Directed Team  
 
 
 
 
 
0.235** 
(7.76) 
Employee in Semi-autonomous Team    0.0713* 
(2.34) 
Other Team Working Employee    0.0210 
(1.23) 
Constant -2.116** 
(-42.54) 
-2.107** 
(-42.32) 
-2.108** 
(-42.39) 
-2.102** 
(-42.53) 
Observations 15902 15902 15902 15902 
R2 0.161 0.160 0.161 0.164 
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Table A5b Sensitivity Checks: Pseudo-panel analysis, fixed effects estimators. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
     Cell total >=60 Cell total >=40 
Trend 0.00612* 
(2.57) 
0.00642** 
(2.61) 
0.00672** 
(2.93) 
0.00567* 
(2.21) 
0.00621* 
(2.54) 
0.00565* 
(2.46) 
Computing Complexity 0.173** 
(2.93) 
 
 
 
 
0.166** 
(2.76) 
0.143* 
(2.35) 
0.207** 
(3.68) 
Team Working Employee 0.332* 
(2.27) 
0.337* 
(2.29) 
0.359* 
(2.43) 
 0.337* 
(2.24) 
0.245+ 
(1.73) 
Short Repetitious Tasks 0.0993+ 
(1.71) 
0.0752 
(1.29) 
0.0919 
(1.59) 
0.100+ 
(1.71) 
0.157* 
(2.52) 
0.136* 
(2.47) 
Learning Environment 
Index 
0.159** 
(2.92) 
0.156** 
(2.83) 
0.160** 
(2.94) 
0.152** 
(2.72) 
0.165** 
(2.91) 
0.164** 
(3.23) 
Self-Employment 0.500* 
(2.15) 
0.529* 
(2.26) 
0.537* 
(2.30) 
0.497* 
(2.12) 
0.545* 
(2.13) 
0.473* 
(2.05) 
Weekly Hours 0.00781+ 
(1.75) 
0.00803+ 
(1.79) 
0.00637 
(1.40) 
0.00771+ 
(1.72) 
0.0100* 
(2.18) 
0.00798+ 
(1.86) 
Computing Importance  
 
0.112* 
(2.50) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Any Computing  
 
 
 
0.422** 
(2.81) 
  
 
 
 
Employee in Self-
Directed Team 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.254 
(1.08) 
  
 
Employee in Semi-
autonomous Team 
   0.423+ 
(1.79) 
  
Other Team Working 
Employee 
   0.328* 
(2.09) 
  
Constant -14.09** 
(-3.01) 
-14.62** 
(-3.01) 
-15.28** 
(-3.38) 
-13.13* 
(-2.58) 
-14.52** 
(-3.01) 
-13.29** 
(-2.92) 
Observations 264 264 264 264 244 284 
R2 0.320 0.312 0.317 0.321 0.339 0.349 
 
 
